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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin's victory 
While the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has yet to release the final 
figures, it is generally accepted that Vladimir Putin has won Russia's presidency 
in the first round of voting, with nearly 53% of the vote. While some analysts have 
raised questions of voting fraud (see, for example, Pavel Felgenhauer on the 
results from Chechnya and Ingushetia in THE MOSCOW TIMES, 30 Mar 00), the 
sense of inevitability that has surrounded Putin's presidential quest since 
Yel'tsin's resignation has served to mute the criticism.  
 
Putin, who, with the possible exception of his jet fighter flight into Chechnya, 
waged a remarkably low-key campaign, was similarly modest in his post-election 
comments. He urged people not to expect "miracles" from his presidency and, 
with a nod to the Communist voters, he promised to consult with the Duma on 
important issues. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 27 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) He 
further suggested that members of different parties could join his new 
government, as long as they shared his views. He later clarified these remarks 
and distanced himself from the idea of forming a coalition government. 
 
A month's wait 
Putin's inauguration, which constitutionally must be held within 30 days of the 
CEC's publication of the final election results, is set for early May, at which time 
Putin plans to unveil his new government and administration. With the election 
finally secured, speculation over Putin's next moves is running rampant through 
the media. Putin himself has highlighted economic policy, urging the speedy 
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completion of his policy team's draft economic program and pinpointing tax 
reform and collection as central issues. 
 
While the composition of the government will not change until after the 
inauguration, Putin held a "cabinet session" with a few select ministers and 
advisers on 30 March. Included in the meeting were First Deputy Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kasyanov, Deputy Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, Government Apparat 
Chief Dmitri Kozak, and State Property Committee Deputy Minister German Gref. 
While the full government held its regular meeting the same day, the above 
group is now considered the new cabinet. (KOMMERSANT DAILY, 31 Mar 00; 
Russian Press Digest, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Putin has also selected a working group to "co-ordinate the law-making activities 
of the Administration and the Government." (SEGODNYA, 31 Mar 00; Russian 
Press Digest, via lexis-nexis) This group includes Kremlin Chief of Staff 
Aleksandr Voloshin, as well as Kasyanov, Kudrin and Gref. The results of their 
work may prove quite revealing of the nature of Putin's presidency. Their work is 
twofold: They are both to sort out relations among the three branches of 
government and to delineate tasks between the Kremlin and the government. 
Given the current composition of the Duma, it is likely that this team's specific 
goal will be to set up consultative and coordinative lines of communication in 
order to eliminate needless conflicts. 
 
Cleaning up the overlap and dualities between the Kremlin and government 
apparats may be the more daunting task. After years of working with an only 
sporadically engaged president, the Kremlin has, at times, become bloated due 
to attempts to control directly as many aspects of policy as possible. At other 
times, stronger hands in the government have asserted authority without Kremlin 
consultation. Putin's declared desire to create a "strong state" suggests that he 
will move to strengthen Kremlin oversight of government functions. If he chooses 
to take a page from Chubais' playbook, that would indicate streamlining the 
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Kremlin apparat with preference in staffing to loyalists and trusted friends. The 
same would be necessary in the government apparatus. Putin will enjoy an 
advantage in this which Chubais, in 1996, could not employ, in that Putin selects 
the prime minister. He will need to choose someone who will not interfere when 
Putin staffs the government's apparat with his own men. With tight control of the 
administrative end of both the Kremlin and government work, Putin is more likely 
to be able to prevent the issuance of "sweetheart deal" decrees to oligarchs and 
perhaps curb some of the rampant corruption. If that is really his plan. 
 
On favorites  
While it is clear through some of his choices thus far that Putin has named a few 
close advisers already, it is yet unclear how close they will be to him next month. 
In the case of German Gref, for example, he appears to have become part of 
Putin's inner circle. As head of the Strategic Research Center, he claims to be 
composing a program for Russia's long-term development for the president. He 
has certainly become very high-profile lately. There are, however, other policy 
groups formulating programs for the president, and there is no guarantee that 
Putin will follow anyone's proposal. Gref himself has said of his work at the 
center, "we have a patron (Putin) and we are just trying to figure out what this 
patron wants." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 2 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Gref also seems to leave a less than stellar impression on observers. After 
attending a conference presentation given by Gref, Pavel Felgenhauer described 
his remarks as "irrationally unspecific." (Of course, there are times the same 
could be said of the new president.) Boris Berezovsky, when prompted by an 
interviewer to comment on Gref, described him as a "weak person," who "doesn't 
understand basic issues." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Berezovsky's interview managed to muddy the waters on presidential favorites 
by, among other things, suggesting that Putin's remarks about fighting the 
oligarchs were just a typical politician choosing the right words "for the voters." 
 4 
While on the one hand dismissing the separation of the oligarchs from power as 
something that "will never happen," Berezovsky did hint darkly that Vladimir 
Gusinsky's Media-MOST group may be headed for trouble. MOST group's media 
holdings include part of NTV, which has been operating comparatively freer from 
state control than Russia's other outlets (and that's faint praise). It has also been 
supportive of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and Former Prime Minister Primakov, a 
stance Berezovsky clearly deemed foolish. Not that MOST would cease to exist 
after the election, "but there will be some redistribution of property, they have 
debts, some big ones..." (Ellipses in original.) (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Is Yavlinsky covered? 
Both the Federal Security Services and the Ministry for Internal Affairs claimed 
oversight of electoral coverage in order to crack down on dirty campaign tricks. In 
the days leading up to the election, ORT TV ran reports claiming Yavlinsky's 
campaign was funded by foreign money, that some of his supporters (specifically 
Gusinsky) were Israeli citizens, and ran a seemingly staged press conference of 
a gay rights group declaring its support for Yavlinsky. Shame on Berezovsky's 
ORT for running the reports and shame on any citizens who may have been 
swayed by them. Do these tactics, or any of the other media attacks on 
Yavlinsky, rise to the level of dirty tricks? Is the FSB or the MVD investigating? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Welcome to the club 
Why should the Russians take democracy seriously when no Western leader 
does? In their rush to congratulate Vladimir Putin on winning the Russian 
elections, presidents and prime ministers decided not to wait for an assessment 
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of the polls' fairness, despite the narrowness of the margin and credible warnings 
of voter fraud. (INTERFAX, 1317 GMT, 24 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0324, via 
World News Connection) Apparently all believed, for example, that Putin's large 
majority in Chechnya reflected the true sentiments of the population he had 
bombed. Luckily their consciences were untroubled by international observers, 
who once again cheerfully attested to the Russians' ability to open polling 
stations and count slips of paper. Yes, the OSCE admitted, there had been some 
bias in major media outlets before the poll, but it had not affected the outcome. 
(INTERFAX, 1115 GMT, 27 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0327, via World News 
Connection) Not even by three percent -- the margin of Putin's majority? 
 
American officials greeted Putin's victory with a familiar "wait-and-see" tone, 
implying either that seven months of brutality in Chechnya was not much to see, 
or that it was not the kind of thing that concerned them. European leaders added 
their dear hope that the man who launched the Chechen war would somehow be 
the best person to end it, but had apparently used up their annual allotment of 
outrage just after the Austrian vote. "Where," asked one French commentator, "is 
the Europe that mobilized against Milosevic and Haider in the name of human 
rights? Can it, should it continue to cajole and finance a Russia that turns its back 
on it more each day?" (LE MONDE, 19 Mar 00; FBIS-WEU-2000-0321, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Consolidating society: strength through peace 
On 24 March, shortly before his election, Putin led his cabinet to sign off on a 
new foreign policy doctrine that seemed to be the work of a man for whom one 
might well overlook some electoral niceties. The new foreign policy would be 
marked by its "realism," Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said. "Our policy is based 
on succession, predictability and mutually beneficial pragmatism. Russia will 
remain an important stabilizing factor of international relations." (ITAR-TASS, 28 
Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
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The few details that emerged hinted at a document formed in the image of Putin's 
life experience. Discipline matters: Foreign policy will be led by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, with less freelancing from the military and trade delegations. 
Economics matter: Russian foreign policy will promote Russia's economic 
interests vigorously against barriers such as Western anti-dumping laws and 
restrictions such as political demands attached to Western loans. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Most importantly -- Russia matters. The doctrine appears finally to put to rest the 
common notion that Putin has two contradictory natures, the democrat of the St. 
Petersburg reforms and the tough nationalist of loyal KGB service. Putin seems 
to want Russia's embassies, intelligence agencies, defense attaches -- even its 
cultural ministries -- to help consolidate domestic life around re-invigorating the 
country so that it can stand taller in the world. 
 
To introduce the rigors of competition to the market at home, Putin the Saint 
Petersburg reformer will promote Russia's integration in the international 
economy. To gain new prosperity and strength for Russia, Putin the former spy 
and apparatchik will put every state agency to work. Speaking with reporters after 
the 24 March meeting, Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov said that the 
"views and interests" of the Russian power departments, including the Foreign 
Intelligence Service, "found reflection" in the new doctrine. Participants at the 
meeting, he said, believed the doctrine "must take into account not only the 
national security interests but also Russia's national interests, including in the 
economic field." (ITAR-TASS, 24 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Call it "velvet mobilization." Putin appears to be putting Russia on a war footing 
without threatening any war. Such a Russia, however, will confound the 
determinists who imagine that economic "reform" leads straight to good behavior 
abroad. Even before the new self-strengthening campaign was underway, Putin 
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promised that "Russia will be more attentively, judiciously and insistently standing 
up for the interests of its citizens -- both those who reside in Russia and those 
who have opted to settle down in the CIS countries, the Baltic States or the 
distant abroad." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 24 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Putin's 
vision may be "realistic" and peaceful for now, but the Russian state he imagines 
is a powerful force for defending the interests of an ethnic nation scattered far 
afield and supposedly downtrodden -- not, history suggests, a recipe for 
perpetual peace. 
 
Speaking with one voice 
The complexities of Kosovo show why Russia feels the need to consolidate its 
international affairs back under the foreign ministry's control. Several elements of 
Russian political life, such as the Duma's committee on foreign affairs and the 
international department of the military -- lean to extreme support for Yugoslavia 
and deep paranoia about NATO's intentions. In greeting the first anniversary of 
NATO's campaign in Kosovo, the foreign ministry showed a far more subtle touch 
-- one more likely to promote Russia's standing as the Kosovo operation 
collapses. 
 
Perhaps in recognition of his abilities, Ivanov appears to have been given 
complete authority over all relations dealing with Kosovo -- even military relations 
with NATO. Ivanov chaired a committee preparing the resumption of the Russia-
NATO Permanent Joint Council (ITAR-TASS, 1209 GMT, 17 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0317, via World News Connection) on March 17, and seems to be in 
complete control of all decisions governing Russian involvement with the 
alliance's peacekeeping forces. Russia, Ivanov has said, will be closely involved 
in deterring a new outbreak of violence between the Yugoslav military and the 
NATO alliance, and would not, despite rumors, withdraw its 3,600 troops from 
KFOR. Ivanov refused, however, to commit Russian police forces to UN patrols. 
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More in sorrow than in anger, Ivanov has used the obvious failures of the Kosovo 
mission to diminish the West's authority, regardless of its military prowess, in 
handling matters of ethnic conflict. Kosovo has proven the perfect foil to Western 
complaints about Chechnya. This may explain why, despite a constant drumbeat 
of criticism from international organizations such as the UNHCR and the 
European Union, Russia has been spared the wrath of elected officials, such as 
Britain's Tony Blair and America's Bill Clinton, who are publicly identified with the 
Kosovo operation. 
 
But watching quietly as the West fails in Kosovo also promotes Russia's long-
term goals. For a Russia newly committed to the fate of its compatriots aboard, 
Kosovo is providing a cautionary tale of the sorrows of intervention in another 
country's interethnic affairs. It is a tale Ivanov is more than pleased to tell. 
 
'New realism' in Russian foreign policy, but no real policy change 
The Russian Security Council may have approved the draft of a new foreign 
policy doctrine on 24 March, but there is little to suggest that major foreign policy 
change is in the works. According to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the 
"newness to Russia's foreign political concept is, primarily, its realism." (ITAR-
TASS, 28 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Despite Ivanov's vague terms, apparently there 
is at least one area that might receive greater emphasis in the new doctrine: 
promotion of Russian economic interests abroad. In fact, Ivanov himself hinted 
that the foreign ministry in particular should play a larger role in promoting 
Russia's economic interests. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 27 Mar 00)  
 
Russia's foreign policy vagueness has prompted some uneasiness in Asian 
countries, which have been carefully observing Russia's foreign policy direction 
under President-elect Vladimir Putin. Despite reassurances by top Russian 
officials, Japanese newspapers elicited a chorus of requests for the Russian 
president to clarify his foreign policy. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 27 Mar 00; 
via lexis-nexis) For Japan, which has been trying to arrange another Russo-
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Japanese summit since Yel'tsin canceled last Fall's meeting, a change in 
Russia's foreign policy on certain key issues like the peace treaty could be of 
domestic political advantage. Thus far, however, Putin appears only willing to rely 
on Japan for economic advice and assistance. The economic realm is the one 
area in which Putin has kept up relations with Japan since his appointment, 
sending various Russian economic officials to Tokyo. So far, this seems to have 
worked; concurrent with last week's visit by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mikhail Kasyanov and Emissary to the G-7 Alexander Livshits, the Japanese 
government released another $100 million tranche of its $1.6 billion loan. As long 
as much-coveted economic cooperation is not hindered, Putin will continue to 
show no interest in changing Russia's stance on the issues that the Japanese 
would really like to see resolved, such as the Kurile Islands. Indeed, according to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, although Russia is conducting ongoing 
negotiations on the peace treaty issue, "Moscow won't relinquish its principle of 
territorial integrity in drafting [it]." (INTERFAX, 1036 GMT, 23 Mar 00; FBIS-EAS-
2000-0323, via World News Connection) Hence, Russia will take all it can get 
without giving up its strategic interests in the region. 
 
Beyond Japan, with which relations have been strained for some time, Russia 
even has issued reassurances to China, with which it has been vigorously 
increasing political and economic ties. However, this time Defense Minister 
Sergeev did the reassuring, telling his Chinese counterpart Chi Haotian that there 
would be no major changes in Moscow's relations with China. (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 30 Mar 00; via RussiaToday.com) For China, the possibility 
of a Russian rapprochement with the West that would eclipse the growing Russo-
Chinese "strategic cooperative partnership" is the main concern. But, Russia's 
new emphasis on expanding economic interests suggests that even if Putin 
builds a more cordial relationship with the West, China will still be an important 
avenue for economic expansion. 
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Russian Federation: Media 
By Jonathan Solomon 
 
A tale of two oligarchs: the one with power (for now)... 
In Russian politics, two weeks is an eternity. Prior to the presidential election, 
Putin stated that one of his first initiatives in office would be to start limiting the 
political influence of the oligarchs. The press ministry's 29 February 
announcement that the broadcast license of Boris Berezovsky's ORT network 
would not be renewed and would be put up for tender in May seemed ominous. 
So did an implied reference to Berezovsky by Rossiyskaya gazeta in a 2 March 
article on "black" propaganda as practiced in both the election and the Russian 
corporate world. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 21 Mar 00) 
 
But Berezovsky did not seem the least perturbed by this posturing. On 25 March, 
editors from Vedomosti, the Russian-language sister paper of the Moscow 
Times, printed an exclusive interview with the oligarch. When he was asked if he 
believed that Putin would try to force him and the other oligarchs from power, 
Berezovsky answered that Putin was being "very pragmatic, just like a regular 
politician." He went on to intimate that, although Putin had said that the oligarchs' 
influence should be reduced, the whole claim was merely "campaign promises." 
"This is normal, it's absolutely right," noted Berezovsky. "Only, it will never 
happen. But his words are right. For the voters." (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; 
via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
Berezovsky seems convinced that Putin's threat against the oligarchs is all 
bluster. Why? There are a few possibilities. One is that, just prior to the election, 
it became clear that Putin would not win as clear a mandate from the people of 
Russia as he might have hoped. The fact that he only won a little more than 52% 
of the vote, as well as the strong showing by Gennady Zyuganov, demonstrates 
that he has not yet consolidated power, and that he lacks the political strength to 
excise the "cancerous" oligarchs.  
 11 
 
Another is that Putin may have no intention of fully attacking the oligarchs, or at 
least not all of them. Putin's claim to fame is the popular Chechen adventure, but 
as that conflict descends into guerrilla warfare and Russian casualties rise, to 
stay in power he may need the backing of Berezovsky and the other "first-tier" 
oligarchs. In this situation, Putin would be allowed to make it appear that he was 
fighting the oligarchs little by little. He would probably take small actions, such as 
placing ORT's license up for tender, for his own public relations image. But, he 
might not mobilize directly against them. No doubt, one of Berezovsky's many 
holdings could buy back the ORT license, and he would thus take no damage. It 
would be a symbolic, yet fake, war on the oligarchs. 
 
The most likely possibility is a synthesis of the other two. Putin is a man who 
seems to consider himself loyal to only a handful of persons. The recently 
deceased former mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, was one of them. 
Sobchak had been one of Putin's professors at Leningrad State University, and 
later brought Putin into politics when, as chairman of the city council, he hired the 
former KGB officer as an aide. Sobchak lost his 1996 re-election attempt amidst 
a series of corruption investigations, but shortly after Putin became prime 
minister in 1999, all charges against his mentor were dropped. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 21 Feb 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) By his own admission, 
Berezovsky lacks that kind of personal relationship with Putin.  
 
Putin's intelligence background also suggests that he knows a thing or two about 
covert warfare, political or otherwise. Comments made by Berezovsky in the 
interview as to how Putin made a name for himself in early 1999 in the Yel'tsin 
administration suggest these skills. "At that time there was a real conflict between 
him and Primakov, who had convinced Yel'tsin to fire Putin from his FSB post. 
Back then, the presidential administration simply saw him as someone who 
wouldn't go anywhere, but would just hold on tight to his own position," stated 
Berezovsky. (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
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Needless to say, Putin was never fired, but Primakov lost his job only months 
later. What is remarkable is how long the two apparently have been feuding, and 
the extremely rapid rise of Putin contrasted with the equally rapid fall of 
Primakov. 
 
What seems likely, then, is that Putin will make every effort to consolidate power 
while stringing along the oligarchs. He will make them think that he needs them, 
and will take the "token actions" against them that they expect. He will be patient. 
But the moment that he sees an opening and feels that he has the power, 
Berezovsky and those like him will be put under a crippling attack. "Some 
particularly well-known oligarchs will have to be dealt with in a special way," said 
unnamed Kremlin sources to Interfax on 28 March. (INTERFAX, 1535 GMT, 28 
Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0328, via World News Connection) Is that a former FSB 
director's "special way"? Sounds intriguing. 
 
Putin seems to know how to play the "sleeping dog" well, if Berezovsky's 
comments are any indication. How long we will have to wait to see if this is true is 
another story entirely, but the political seasons in Moscow change a lot more 
often than the weather. 
 
...And the one on the verge of losing it 
What is certain is that Putin will be able to claim that he excised one oligarch in 
the near future. Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-MOST empire is under assault from 
virtually all directions. In his interview, Berezovsky grimly predicted that after 
Putin is elected, "MOST will be around. But there will be some redistribution of its 
property, they have debts, some big ones..." (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com)  
 
NTV is MOST's flagship holding. MOST has also invested in Novaya gazeta in 
the past, and MOST Bank handles Obshchaya gazeta's accounts. (RFE/RL: 
RUSSIAN MEDIA EMPIRES V REPORT; via 
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http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia5/most.html) These three outlets have 
been among the most critical in recent times of the Putin administration and the 
Chechen war. On top of that, Novaya gazeta has been investigating, among 
other things, the Ryazan "terrorist bomb drill," Putin's possible ties to corruption, 
and the sources of Yel'tsin's 1996 and Putin's 2000 campaign funds.  
 
Little wonder then that that the FSB allegedly tried to coerce an NTV personality 
to act as a mole within the network. Or that Novaya gazeta's internal computer 
server was hacked on 15 March and two issues' layouts were destroyed. (See 
THE NIS OBSERVED, 21 Mar 00) In addition to the computer hack, according to 
Novaya gazeta's deputy editor Yuri Shchekochikhin, the paper's offices had been 
burglarized and a computer with the list of advertisers had been stolen the 
previous week. He claimed that, since then, a number of advertisers had voided 
their contracts with the paper. This was in addition to the four tax audits 
conducted on the paper in the last two years alone. (FINANCIAL TIMES, World 
News-Europe, 17 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
NTV has had rough times this year in its own right. The natural gas monopoly 
Gazprom had owned roughly 30% of NTV's stock since 1996, and in late 1999 
announced that it was attempting to buy up another 13% or so of NTV's shares. 
Yet, until recently, the giant remained quiet with regards to its views on NTV's 
editorial policies. On 15 February, however, Gazprom chairman Rem Vyakhirev 
stung NTV with a sharp rebuke for its coverage of Chechnya. "As the head of 
Gazprom and as a citizen," he said, "I do not consider the position of NTV 
leadership on the Chechnya problem entirely correct." He went on to suggest that 
highlighting "negative aspects" of the government's war against the "bandits" was 
"simply inappropriate." These "negative aspects" include reports on federal troop 
and civilian casualties, as well as the refugee crisis. They gave Gazprom pause 
to review its media investments within the framework of the company's interests, 
"which obviously cannot contradict the interests of the state," said Vyakhirev. 
(MOSCOW TIMES, 15 Feb 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
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The pressure this implicitly placed on NTV to "get with the Kremlin's program or 
else" should not be underestimated. Consider how last Fall, as NTV gave air to 
opponents of the Unity bloc in the Duma elections, the state-run 
Vneshekonombank called in the $42.2 million NTV owed. Then, on 17 February 
of this year, the Supreme Arbitration Court decided to uphold the antimonopoly 
ministry's intention to force NTV to pay dues retroactively for the use of state 
broadcasting assets. Yel'tsin had decreed in 1998 that the network was vital to 
democracy in Russia, and thus it should have the same broadcast facility-use 
discounts as state-run ORT and RTR. But in the spring of 1999, the ministry 
charged that NTV had been paying those rates since 1996 in violation of "fair 
competition laws." With the court decision, NTV could be forced to pay millions in 
back dues, and at any time Putin can revoke the Yel'tsin decree, which currently 
saves NTV $13 million annually. (MOSCOW TIMES, 19 Feb 00; via 
www.moscowtimes.ru) Gusinsky could not afford to keep NTV running much 
longer should Gazprom threaten to sell off its shares, the retroactive debt be 
called in, and the special decree be revoked. 
 
Recently, ORT opened up a full barrage against NTV and Gusinsky just before 
the presidential election to boot. Gusinsky and NTV backed YABLOKO candidate 
Grigory Yavlinsky in the campaign. So, in addition to its "relentlessly positive" 
coverage of Putin, on the evening of 23 March ORT painted Yavlinsky as "the 
candidate of gays and foreigners," while it played upon lingering anti-Semitic 
attitudes in society by calling "NTV as a channel dangerous in that it was run by a 
Jew, Gusinsky." (MOSCOW TIMES, 30 Mar 00; www.themoscowtimes.ru) Its 
reports suggested that Gusinsky was directly bankrolling Yavlinsky, as were 
other prominent Russian and Israeli Jewish businessmen. Shots of Gusinsky at a 
banquet with Hasidic Jews were shown. (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 
25 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)  
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It is clear that Gusinsky and MOST are in the Kremlin's crosshairs, and they 
know it. Rather than openly contesting these turns of events, NTV's general 
director and co-owner, Yevgeny Kiselev, cited Putin's backing of free speech on 
the Itogi news program on 12 February, and begged him to treat state and 
private networks equally. (MOSCOW TIMES, 19 Feb 00; via 
www.moscowtimes.ru) Putin has the upper hand with regards to Gusinsky and 
MOST, and NTV continues to broadcast at the president-elect's pleasure. It is 
unlikely that MOST will change its coverage to pacify the Kremlin. So, when Putin 
has had enough, the other shoe will drop and that will be it for Gusinsky. His 
holdings will be divided up, but he will likely be allowed to leave the country 
should he so desire. It is only a matter of time. 
 
The Chechens get TV! 
And lastly, on a lighter note, Putin's spokesman on Chechnya, Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky, was proud to announce on 22 March that persons in the region's 
mountainous areas can now receive RTR, thanks to a new transmitter in 
Gudermes. (ITAR-TASS, 1706 GMT, 22 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0322, via 
World News Connection ) Don't you wonder how lucky they must feel? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
JUDICIARY 
Putin discusses independence of the country's courts 
In a meeting with Vyacheslav Lebedev, chairman of the Supreme Court of the 
Federation, Putin said that the court system should be financed exclusively from 
federal sources. He voiced concern that the independence of the nation's courts 
could possibly be compromised if judges, clerks and administrative staff had to 
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rely on regions and municipalities for their livelihoods. (ITAR-TASS, 1310 GMT, 
16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via World News Connection) 
 
Putin is correct in his concern over the independence of the Russian court 
system, but the problem lies closer to home. The threat to judicial independence 
comes from the executive branch's routine flouting of court rulings, manipulation 
of judicial appointments, and other machinations which leave the legitimacy of 
the whole constitutional arrangement open to question. Of course judges need to 
be paid, but so do soldiers, teachers, and other public servants. The re-
centralization of authority and control is no panacea, even in the face of 
perceived chaos and the expansion of regional power. Putin forgets why the 
regions were forced almost overnight to pick up the tab for the federal employees 
stationed on their respective territories -- Moscow ceased to do so. A better 
approach to ensuring judicial independence is vigorous enforcement of the 
country's laws, something the federal prosecutor's office has been prevented 
from doing since the day it launched an investigation into possible kickback 
arrangements between the Yel'tsin "Family" and a Swiss construction firm a year 
ago. Until the law is respected, it does not matter much who writes the checks for 
the judges' salaries. 
 
REGIONS 
Vladivostok Duma by-election invalidated 
Vladivostok electoral politics is probably the most rough-and-tumble in the 
federation today. It was not until December 1999 that the city finally passed a 
charter thereby bringing it into accordance with every other city in the country. 
But the struggle continues. The regional election commission has recently 
invalidated the apparent electoral victory of former Vladivostok Mayor Viktor 
Cherepkov, who received a plurality of the vote with 27 percent. The reason for 
the commission's decision is its claim that the Primory district court had ruled two 
days before the 26 March elections that the registration of another candidate, 
Orysya Bondarenko, had been improperly revoked. This, so argued the 
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commission, invalidated the electoral results and Cherepkov's victory. The 
relevant documents have been submitted to the Central Election Commission in 
Moscow for a final decision; whatever the outcome, no doubt there will be an 
appeal. (ITAR-TASS, 0635 GMT, 30 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0330, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Putin speaks to Union of Russian Cities 
At the 21 March meeting in Novosibirsk, Putin spoke to the Union of Russian 
Cities of the need to coordinate the actions of municipal authorities to benefit the 
entire population. He also spoke disapprovingly of the municipal authorities' 
tendency to ignore or pass local laws contrary to federal law. Most tellingly, 
however, was Putin's oblique reference to the often strained relations between 
the regions' governors and mayors. Putin seemed to suggest a federal/municipal 
alliance to limit the power of the governors. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Mar 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0324, via World News Connection) 
 
This speech was given only a week before the presidential elections, so it is hard 
to know how much of the speech was about policy and how much about election 
season promises. The answer will come in the actions of the new Putin 
administration. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Russian information warfare, Soviet style 
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin called for an increased emphasis on 
information science in the military-industrial sector on 21 March at an all-Russia 
conference of defense and agrarian workers. Putin stated Russia has been 
lagging behind other countries in this field since the Cold War, and that lagging 
behind in the information field might result in backwardness in "everything else." 
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(ITAR-TASS, 1242 GMT, 21 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0321, via World News 
Connection) Putin's concerns are justified since the information age will have a 
profound impact in economics, politics, society, and particularly military affairs. 
 
Russia's latest national security concept, published 14 January, lists Russian 
information resources as a national interest. Specifics include the development of 
modern telecommunications, protection of the state's information resources from 
unsanctioned access, and the problems of Russia's weakened potential in this 
field and dependence upon foreign technology, which undermine Russia's ability 
to defend itself. In addition to worries about NATO expansion, the document 
notes, Russia is also very concerned about the desire of a number of countries to 
dominate the global information sphere and expel Russia from the external and 
internal information market. (NEZAVISIMOYE VOENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 14 
Jan 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Russia's draft military doctrine also addresses 
information warfare, listing it as an external and internal threat to the government, 
economy, and military. The document even acknowledges that information 
warfare will constitute a basic general feature of modern war. Specific Russian 
applications of information warfare are "information preparation (information 
blockade, expansion, aggression) and the confusion of public opinion of certain 
states and of the world community as a whole." (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Oct 99; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
Military analysts at the US Foreign Military Studies Office have researched 
Russian views on information-based warfare extensively. For Russia, information 
warfare is conducted in peacetime and wartime. This is a significant departure 
from the US view which currently confines information warfare to periods of crisis 
or conflict. One reason for this departure is the fact that the Russian state, 
economy, and society are in transition resulting from institutional and 
philosophical instability; therefore, Russian citizens are vulnerable to 
unscrupulous promises of economic and social prosperity. Traditional Russian 
military thinking has also developed differently from the West due to geographical 
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considerations, varied military threats, and an emphasis placed on the study of 
military affairs as a science. In wartime, information warfare refers to the 
attainment of superiority in the use of information protection and suppression 
systems, to include command and control, electronic warfare, and 
reconnaissance. (CALL PUBLICATION No. 98-21; Foreign Military Studies 
Office) 
 
The Soviet Union was very adept at peacetime information warfare, specifically 
the practice of information manipulation and perception management. This 
practice rose in prominence during the war in Chechnya, where Russia imposed 
strict news media controls on their "anti-terrorist operation." (NIS OBSERVED, 29 
Feb and 21 Mar 00) Journalists arriving in the Northern Caucasus had to seek 
accreditation from the press center of the armed forces, technically an illegal 
requirement since neither a state of war nor emergency had been declared. The 
military was given the right to brand journalists as either "desirable" or 
"undesirable," depending on if their work supported the government's official 
position. Government-controlled television and radio stations graphically 
highlighted alleged Chechen atrocities, repeated the military's understated 
casualty rates, and squashed efforts by independent news media to provide 
objective coverage. The refugees' plight and destruction of "liberated" Grozny 
due to Russia's scorched earth tactics were relegated to the back pages. 
(PERSPECTIVE, March-April 2000) As a result, Russian public support for the 
war remained solid. Military personnel fighting the Chechens believed they were 
patriots, and any Russian who protested the operation was considered a traitor. 
Although Russia waged a successful information operations campaign on the 
homefront, information warfare on the battlefield was less successful. 
 
Russia's backwardness in intelligence gathering and dissemination contributed to 
the Russian army's inability to counter the Chechen's hit-and-run tactics. Early in 
the war, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, who has responsibility for Russia's 
satellites, boasted the satellite fleet was operating in the interest of the federal 
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troops. Independent analysts disputed this claim, stating the troops could not 
make use of the one optical intelligence satellite which was believed to fly over 
Chechnya once per day. Although the data were useful in identifying Chechen 
vehicles, the data was out of date when it arrived in the troops hands. Federal 
troops did not have the capability to download satellite data instantly, therefore, 
the mobile Chechen targets had plenty of time to move to a new location. The 
military only used the data to destroy fixed targets such as bridges and buildings, 
alienating the local population which Russian forces were sent to "liberate." 
(DEFENSE NEWS, 13 Dec 99) In this aspect of information warfare -- the ability 
to move data rapidly from sensor to shooter within an agile enemy's decision 
cycle -- the Russian military was deficient. 
 
Despite their present deficiencies in the information sphere, Russian thinkers and 
strategists have devoted considerable energy to information warfare, and it is 
apparent they clearly understand its utility in conflict. The problem is, can 
Russia's generals reorganize their armed forces to take full advantage of the 
information age and counter future adversaries employing guerrilla tactics? 
Despite two bloody battles for Grozny, Russian generals are still wed to a clumsy 
command structure leading large troop and armored formations into battle. These 
battles include massive air and artillery bombardments using battle plans 
approved by superiors well in advance. This doctrine prevents the Russian army 
from seizing the initiative and more efficiently attacking the Chechens at their 
weakest moments. A smaller, better trained, more professional army is required 
to counter guerrilla warfare. (PERSPECTIVE, March-April 00) Russian generals 
still dream of major conflicts between nation-states (such as World War II and 
Desert Storm) which are becoming less common. In the near future, Russia's 
more probable scenarios will involve stopping ethnic conflict in border regions 
where adversaries are likely to employ guerrilla tactics. 
 
The onset of the information age marginalizes the utility of large conscript armies 
and formations of tanks, aircraft, and ships. Capabilities of individual platforms 
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are becoming less relevant. It is increasingly more important to "network" military 
platforms together and increase the forces' combat power, enabling them to 
strike an adversary quickly at his weakest point versus battling toe to toe. In the 
near future, Russia may watch the West's trial and error with first generation 
information age technology. Forced by necessity, a gradual change in culture 
and organization of the Russian military may enable Moscow to seize other 
advantages of information warfare in the future. 
 
Sergeev is retained ... at least for the time being 
Despite much speculation over the "almost certain" replacement of Defense 
Minister Marshal Igor D. Sergeev, President-elect Vladimir Putin has once again 
shown his elusive personality and announced his intention to keep Sergeev in his 
current position. Following on the heels of the presidential election, Putin 
announced on 28 March that he was extending Sergeev's term as defense 
minister for another year. (INTERFAX, 1201 GMT, 28 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0328, via World News Connection) This latest term is Sergeev's third as defense 
minister. He was appointed in 1997 and served two previous one-year terms 
under former President Boris Yel'tsin. Sergeev will be 62 on 20 April. 
 
The Sergeev announcement was Putin's first major personnel declaration 
following presidential elections, and came as something of a surprise. Many in 
and outside Russia believed that Putin would move quickly to replace Sergeev. 
The two most likely candidates for the defense minister position had been the 
present chairman of the Duma's defense committee, General Andrei Nikolaev, 
and the current chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin. (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 15 Feb 00) Sergeev has been seen as a passive defense chief at a 
time when the need for aggressive leadership is clear both in terms of much-
needed military reform and the present war in Chechnya.  
 
Issues of military reform and the success of Russian forces in Chechnya are 
high-profile issues for Putin. Much of his success to date has been tied to the 
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"success" of military operations in Chechnya and his open courting of the armed 
forces. This courting in turn hinges heavily on his ability to move forward on long-
standing cries for extensive Russian military reforms. For these reasons, Putin's 
justification for keeping Sergeev on the payroll is not clear. It became even 
murkier with the 28 March announcement by Putin's press secretary, Aleksei 
Gromov, that Putin actually made his decision "some time ago" to extend 
Sergeev's term as defense minister. (INTERFAX, 1201 GMT, 28 Mar 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0328, via World News Connection) -- apparently while rumors of 
Sergeev's replacement were at their height.  
 
So why did Putin keep Sergeev on? One guess is that Putin's decision is a 
calculated move to give the Russian public the impression that he is satisfied 
with the present operations in Chechnya, that everything is going according to 
plan. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 Mar 00) This may persuade the general 
public. Putin's announcement also rewards Marshal Sergeev for his solid support 
and maintains the defense status quo, throwing water on any potential power 
plays and instability within the defense ministry based on anticipated leadership 
changes. Keeping the armed forces pacified is critical to Putin as he places more 
of his focus on resurrecting the Russian economy and other domestic issues.  
 
If this is, in fact, Putin's game plan, then he is playing a very volatile game that 
could very easily blow up in his face. It is clear from media coverage that the war 
in Chechnya is bogged down. There is no clear ending to the conflict, no 
"glorious Russian victory" any time in the near future. There are only back-and-
forth reports of Russian advances, followed by reports of Russian withdrawals 
and setbacks. Add to these items growing Russian casualties and the overall 
impact eventually will be to crack what has been overwhelming Russian public 
support for Putin, especially in the absence of any positive actions on the 
economic front.  
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Very few analysts believe Sergeev will serve his full term. More likely, Putin's 
retention of Sergeev is a prevarication: pacifying the public and the military while 
putting difficult and costly reform issues on the back burner. This, coupled with 
regular pronouncements of support for the military and hints at change, will keep 
the military on the hook. It also holds Sergeev in place as a possible scapegoat 
for future failures regarding military reform and Chechnya while Putin, playing to 
the larger public audience, tackles more pressing plans for the economy and 
other domestic issues.  
 
In the meantime ... the military votes 
Not surprisingly, the military voted heavily in the recent presidential elections. 
Ninety-seven percent of Russia's 1.2 million troops went to the ballot boxes, or in 
the case of Chechnya, the ballot box went to them.  
- 83% of servicemen in Kamchatka voted 
- 78% of servicemen in Sakhalin voted 
- 84% of servicemen in the Kuriles voted 
- 91% of servicemen in the Pacific Fleet voted 
- 98% of servicemen in Chechnya voted 
 
According to Major General Nikolai Burbyga, director of the defense ministry's 
education department, voting was overwhelming for Vladimir Putin... no real 
surprise.  
- 81% of servicemen deployed to Chechnya voted for Putin 
- 80% of servicemen outside of Russia voted for Putin 
-- 87.3% of peacekeepers assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina voted for Putin 
-- 86% of sailors assigned to the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol voted for Putin 
 
The remaining small percentage of military votes was divided between other 
presidential candidates: Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Gennady 
Zyuganov. 
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(INTERFAX, 1000 GMT, 27 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0327, ITAR-TASS, 0929 
GMT, 26 Mar 00, and INTERFAX, 1843 GMT, 26 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0326, 
via World News Connection) 
 
In Chechnya, polling stations and mobile ballot boxes were established at sites of 
deployed military units. According to Lt Gen Vladimir Kozhemyakin, "The ballot 
boxes (were) brought directly to areas of military missions, such as block posts, 
guard units, and other places where military personnel cannot go to polling 
stations. Further, in cases where ballot boxes could not be transported by air, 
then they were delivered by ground transport vehicles accompanied by a military 
convoy. (ITAR-TASS, 0857 GMT, 24 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0324, via World 
News Connection). And if anyone should worry that that this aggressive program 
to get out the military vote could have been tainted, armed forces representative 
Kozhemyakin assured all that there were no violations in the organization of the 
polls and absolute compliance with voting laws and regulations. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Russia, streamlined GUUAM maintain security differences  
At the mid-March meeting of eight CIS defense ministers in Moscow, Russia 
showed that it is not going to abandon its designs to dominate "counter-terrorism" 
plans for the CIS. In an apparent attempt to clear up some of the questions that 
last month's CIS heads of state meeting raised about FSB units possibly being 
stationed on CIS soil, the Russian government sent its FSB director, Nikolai 
Patrushev, to join the defense ministers. Although Patrushev clarified the mission 
of the Antiterrorism Center, which will "gather and analyze information on 
international terrorism," he made no reference to the Antiterrorism Program that 
might include participation by FSB special units. Instead, the FSB director only 
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stressed that the center will not have "strong-arm functions." (ITAR-TASS, 1058 
GMT, 16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via World News Connection) 
 
Over the past year, Russia has continually used "antiterrorism" rhetoric to 
reassert its dominance in the CIS, especially among those nations that it 
considers its closer partners. In a recent interview, Russian Security Council 
Head Sergei Ivanov specifically singled out Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan as Russia's CIS "allies" when he noted that "the CIS 
is no longer a unified field." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0316, via World News Connection) Interestingly, Ivanov left out Uzbekistan, 
which is officially a GUUAM member but has participated in various joint defense 
exercises with Russia since last year. Only two weeks later, Uzbekistan decided 
to pull its battalion out of the Southern Peace Shield-2000 exercises in Tajikistan, 
opting to conduct its portion of the exercise inside Uzbekistan. (ITAR-TASS, 
0656 GMT, 29 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) However, it doesn't appear that 
Uzbekistan will be joining three of its fellow GUUAM members in forming a 
Georgia-Azerbaijan-Ukraine peacekeeping unit, either. Although the unit is still in 
the planning stages, the "GAU" presidents plan to have their peacekeepers 
receive authorization from the UN or OSCE and remain apart from the Russian-
dominated CIS peacekeeping forces. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 20 
Mar 00) In this streamlined forum, GAU has maintained its opposition to the so-
called "Russia-6" or Collective Security Treaty members, despite the optimistic 
words GAU officials had for Putin's leadership at the January heads of state 
summit in Moscow. For now, the CIS remains split on issues of CIS security, as 
Russia seeks dominance among its "allies" and GAU desperately looks 
westward. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
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UKRAINE 
Constitution? What constitution? 
The Ukrainian Constitutional Court has apparently decided that it will now be 
known as the "We'll just fudge it a little and maybe nobody will notice because we 
really don't want to make the tough choices" court. 
 
On 29 March, the court ruled that Kuchma's proposed All-Ukraine referendum 
can go forward with two revisions. On 16 April, voters will be asked whether they 
approve Kuchma's initiatives to (1) eliminate parliamentary immunity, (2) cut the 
number of parliamentary deputies from 450 to 300, (3) make the unicameral 
legislature a bicameral model, and (4) allow the president to disband parliament if 
it fails to form a majority within one month or does not pass a budget within three 
months of its submission by the executive branch. 
 
The court did rule, however, that two of Kuchma's proposed questions were 
unconstitutional. It will not allow Kuchma to ask voters whether they have 
confidence in parliament, and give him the power to disband the body in the 
event of a no-confidence vote. It will also not allow a question on whether a new 
constitution should be approved through direct referendum instead of by the 
parliament.  
 
Even with these questions disallowed, however, the referendum is 
constitutionally questionable. This fact appears to have been lost on many of 
Kuchma's critics and most of his supporters, who seem happy just to have had 
the most troublesome questions rejected. The European Union released a 
statement that read, in part, "This decision is a positive development, which 
provides encouraging evidence of the effective functioning of Ukrainian 
democratic institutions." (REUTERS, 0852 GMT, 4 Apr 00; via America Online) 
Ukrainian Parliamentary Deputy Serhiy Holovaty, who is also a former justice 
minister, said, "With this decision the Constitutional Court has practically 
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defeated the intentions of those who wanted to effect an anti-constitutional coup 
in Ukraine." (REUTERS, 0902 GMT, 29 Mar 00; via America Online)  
 
"Practically" is the operative word. The Constitution of Ukraine contains some 
interesting tidbits that seem to have gone unnoticed by many in the country. This 
burdensome document notes the following: 
 
"The constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine consists of 
450 National Deputies of Ukraine who are elected for a four-year term on the 
basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot." (Article 76) 
 
"National Deputies of Ukraine are guaranteed parliamentary immunity." (Article 
80) 
 
The questions approved by the Constitutional Court, therefore, amount to 
amending the constitution. So, according to this document, how are amendments 
supposed to be adopted? 
 
"A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine may be 
submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine or by no 
fewer National Deputies of Ukraine than one-third of the constitutional 
composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine." (Article 154) 
 
"A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, ... 
previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted if, at the next regular 
session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds ... have voted 
in favor thereof." (Article 155) 
 
There is no mention in "Chapter XIII: Introducing Amendments to the Constitution 
of Ukraine" of amendment by referendum. And yet, the Constitutional Court, by a 
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vote of 15 to 3 with one abstention, found these questions constitutional and -- 
most importantly -- binding. "Government bodies will be obliged to take [those 
results] into account and adopt the appropriate measures about those questions 
addressed in the referendum." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 31 Mar 00)  
 
Perhaps the politically appointed judges (six by the president, six by the 
Congress of Judges and six by the parliament) recognized that the power 
structure of the country has become lopsided in favor of the president, and acted 
accordingly. Or perhaps these judges, who cannot be reappointed, simply did not 
want to make the difficult decision to pronounce the entire referendum 
unconstitutional.  
 
Ukrainian political analyst Mykhailo Pohrebinsky suggests, however, that the 
court will once again be called upon to examine the situation if the referendum 
questions are passed. "What is required now is for the Constitutional Court to 
consider a new case -- what to do if parliament doesn't implement the people's 
will?" (REUTERS, 3 Apr 00; via America Online) In fact, according to the 
constitution, that body is in no way required to do so.  
 
For this reason, on 4 April, the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly 
(PACE) warned Ukraine that it could be suspended if Kuchma moves forward 
with his poll before the parliament passes a new law of referenda. Although the 
PACE suspension would probably be more symbolic than meaningful, as one of 
the few predominantly Western organizations that have accepted Ukraine, it 
would be a difficult blow to the country's West-oriented foreign policy. This fact 
does not seem to concern Kuchma, who vowed to continue with the vote.  
 
In January, when Kuchma first suggested that he would hold a referendum, this 
writer asked, "Does Kuchma want to be king?" and suggested that the only way 
these questions would be approved by the Constitutional Court would be if 
Ukraine planned to "follow Russia's lead and contort the constitution to fit the 
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whims of the presidential administration." (THE NIS OBSERVED, 17 Jan 00) This 
week, we discovered that the Constitutional Court has learned well from Russia, 
as Kuchma began planning his coronation. 
 
Meanwhile, in the council's parliamentary assembly ... 
The new constitutional tangle with the Council of Europe comes just as Ukraine 
had finally eliminated a major disagreement with that body by outlawing the 
death penalty. It also comes as representatives of ethnic Russian organizations 
in Ukraine are appealing to the council to look into what they call Ukraine's 
"Russophobia." In a statement to the council's parliamentary assembly, The 
Ukrainian Slavic Party wrote, "The Ukrainian language policy is based on 
Russophobia, as is manifested by the fact that the Russian language is almost 
not taught to junior classes, ... and even in senior classes it is taught in miserly 
doses." (INTERFAX, 22 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
There is undoubtedly a reason that the Slavic Party statement uses vague terms 
like "almost not taught" and "miserly doses." The exact figures would simply not 
support the argument. According to government data, 34 percent of primary and 
secondary students were taught in the Russian language during the 1998-1999 
year. Twenty-five percent of preschoolers were taught in Russian, and 34 
percent of students in higher education were taught in Russian. While this is 
down considerably from 1991, when approximately 50 percent of all students 
were taught in Russian, the figures more adequately represent the current 
language breakdown of the country. The Russian language school figures, 
incidentally, remain above 98 percent in Crimea, 87 percent in Luhansk Oblast' 
and 90 percent in Donetsk Oblast', in spite of the existence of significant 
numbers of Ukrainian speakers in these areas. (THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY, 5 
Mar 00; via Arel's The Ukraine List #76) That's quite an interesting understanding 
of the term "miserly."  
 
BELARUS 
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How not to make friends and influence enemies 
Following the Freedom March II on 15 March, Belarusian authorities tried 
valiantly to intimidate protesters into not amassing for the opposition's next 
scheduled protest on 25 March. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the rest 
of his administration seemed to believe that, by outlawing the protest and 
threatening opposition members with arrest, they could limit the demonstration's 
effect internationally. They failed miserably. 
 
Unlike Freedom March I and II, the 25 March commemoration of the 1918 
declaration of the Belarus Republic garnered significant Western attention -- 
thanks to Lukashenka's tactics.  
 
According to Belapan, between 5,000 and 7,000 people attempted to gather at 
the designated rally point, ignoring the threats from authorities that they would be 
arrested. Belapan noted, "Yakub Kolas Square ... was cordoned off by rows of 
helmeted police. The underground railroad exits leading to the square were also 
blocked. Two police armored personnel carriers could be seen on the square." 
The report continued, "Police groups waded into crowds with truncheons and 
grabbed people, pushing them into police vehicles. More than two hundred 
people were detained, including cameramen and reporters of the Russian 
television networks RTR, NTV and ORT, as well as Christopher Panico, 
counselor of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus." (BELAPAN, 
0230 GMT, 25 Mar 00) 
 
Reaction from outside Belarus was swift in appearing. Vladimir Putin reportedly 
intervened immediately in order to facilitate the release of at least one dozen 
Russian reporters. The OSCE responded sharply to the arrest of its 
representative, who had diplomatic status. And the United States and European 
Union called the Belarus tactics "brutal." US Department of State Spokesman 
James Foley said, "The authorities deployed police with dogs, riot troops and 
armored personnel carriers ... to arrest 300 to 500 Belarusian citizens, reportedly 
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beating many of them." According to Foley, Polish MP Mariusz Kaminski and 35 
journalists from Russia, Belarus and Poland were among those arrested. For the 
first time, Foley also signaled that the US had given up all hopes of using 
dialogue to solve the crisis in Belarus. "The Lukashenka regime's suppression of 
this demonstration makes clear its disinterest in dialogue," he said. (REUTERS, 
1950 GMT, 27 Mar 00) This is a significant departure from several previous 
statements. There are also unconfirmed reports from Charter-97 that the US is 
considering the introduction of some type of economic sanction. 
 
Lukashenka, meanwhile, underwent a major shift in opinion as international 
reaction began to pour in. On 25 March, while on an official visit to the United 
Arab Emirates, he wholeheartedly supported the police actions, suggesting that 
such things are necessary to "maintain law and order." He said, "Any disorders 
have to be stopped and we will do that." (ITAR-TASS, 2016 GMT, 25 Mar 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0325, via World News Connection) 
 
Just days later, however, Lukashenka apparently found his humanity, criticizing 
police for "serious mistakes." He said, "It is as if law enforcement bodies 
deliberately make serious mistakes in their jobs at exactly the moment when the 
head of the state has left the country." (REUTERS, 1351 GMT, 31 Mar 00; via 
America Online) How unfortunate that Lukashenka was not in the country to take 
care of the situation. And how convenient. 
 
According to Interior Minister Yuri Sivakov, before Lukashenka left Minsk, he told 
Sivakov to ensure order. "We fulfilled this task," Sivakov said. (REUTERS, 1950 
GMT, 27 Mar 00; via America Online) Sivakov is apparently also fulfilling another 
task -- scapegoat.  
 
Meanwhile, opposition members have vowed to continue their protests. For the 
first time, thanks to Lukashenka, they will do it with the strong support of the 
West. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Can sanctions reinstate peace talks? 
President Putin's response to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) sanctions on Russia shows that he can be persuaded to 
compromise. Amid all the anti-Western bluster about a new iron curtain and 
Western support of "terrorism," there was a concession announced the day after 
the vote: Direct presidential rule will not be imposed on Chechnya. (ITAR-TASS, 
7 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
On 6 April Russian representatives were still defending the plan to introduce 
direct rule for several years by reference to Soviet legislation. (AFP, 6 Apr 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List) Putin had backed this idea very forcefully over the last 
month, but on the day after the PACE vote he suddenly decided to abandon it. 
While this decision can in no way satisfy PACE demands for a cease-fire, peace 
talks, and a war crimes inquiry, it does mean that those goals are attainable -- if 
member governments find the political will to continue along this course. 
 
In the last days of March, revelations that clandestine negotiations with the 
Maskhadov government have been ongoing since January were followed by calls 
for a political solution to the conflict. The PACE vote builds on those 
developments, bolsters domestic peace advocates and creates greater internal 
and external pressure for a negotiated settlement. 
 
On 6 April a two-thirds majority of the PACE voted to suspend Russia's voting 
privileges and called on the ministers of the member states to initiate 
proceedings to suspend Russia's membership in the Council of Europe unless 
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Russia immediately makes "substantial, accelerating and demonstrable 
progress" towards eradicating human rights abuses and calling a cease-fire in 
Chechnya. The assembly also directed member nations to bring war crimes 
charges against Russia in the European Court for Human Rights. (REUTERS, 6 
Apr 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Council of Europe foreign ministers are 
scheduled discuss the possibility of suspending Russia from the body on 10 
April. 
 
The PACE vote comes amidst mounting pressure to pursue renewed 
negotiations with the Chechens. On 4 April, the speaker of the Federation 
Council, Yegor Stroev, called for a policy of negotiations and an end to the 
Chechen war, saying, "Either we continue to play hide-and-seek with society or 
we undertake steps to end the war and begin to resolve the problem peacefully." 
(ITAR-TASS, 4 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis) The US ambassador, James Collins, 
echoed that call on the following day, saying that the war must end in a political 
solution. (INTERFAX, 5 Apr 00; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
According to recent revelations, peace talks have been underway for months 
even as presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky continued to set 
unrealistic conditions for the start of such talks, including the elimination of 
Chechen armed forces and the surrender of Chechen field commanders. But 
even Yastrzhembsky has commented that perhaps Maskhadov, who has been 
charged with leading an insurrection, can be given amnesty. (ITAR-TASS, 30 
Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
According to Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev and North Ossetian 
President Alexander Dzasokhov, the two have been serving as intermediaries 
since January. Informal groups, including North Caucasian leaders and federal 
government representatives, have been meeting to discuss possible avenues for 
negotiations. A written proposal was passed through intermediaries to the 
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Chechen authorities in early March, but no response has been forthcoming. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 31 Mar 00)  
 
According to Aushev, the proposals were "quite logical and reasonable .. (and) 
could have provided a basis for negotiations. (...) Maskhadov and his cabinet 
members should accept these proposals. They had better forget any ambitions, 
now that the fate of the whole people is at stake." (VESTI, 29 Mar 00; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
It's possible these proposals were scuttled by Putin's intention to institute direct 
rule over Chechnya, first broached at roughly the same time as Aushev 
transferred the proposals to Maskhadov. Aushev has commented that the 
institution of direct presidential rule would be unconstitutional and 
counterproductive. He pointed out that the federal government already has a 
high-ranking official serving as representative in Chechnya, Deputy Prime 
Minister Nikolai Koshman. In practical terms, a change in the formalities of 
federal governance over Chechnya would have no bearing on the course of the 
war, characterized recently by mounting guerrilla raids against Russian positions. 
(INTERFAX, 30 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) In an earlier interview he explained that 
the federal government has resisted proposals of instituting direct presidential 
rule over the Prigorodnyi krai district, (a conflict zone between the Ossets and the 
Ingush) precisely on the grounds that this measure lacks constitutional basis. 
(INTERFAX, 16 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The sum of Aushev's statements represents a fairly coherent program: Peace 
negotiations must be held between Maskhadov's and Putin's representatives, the 
Chechen side must respond to the last set of proposals, and the final status of 
Chechnya should be determined by popular referendum. (VREMYA MN, 3 Mar 
00; via lexis-nexis) 
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The details of the proposals forwarded to the Chechens have not been revealed. 
However, the lack of response and Aushev's recommendation to "forget any 
ambitions" suggest that the terms were probably fairly harsh.  
 
The international community would do well to build on the PACE vote by 
reminding Russia of its obligations under previous agreements that remain 
woefully unfulfilled, but should constitute the foundation for any future 
negotiations. 
 
1) According to the peace treaty of 12 May 1997, Russian and Chechnya agreed 
"to stop the centuries old confrontation" and "build further relations in accordance 
with generally recognized principles and norms of international law" and 
"cooperate on the basis of certain specific agreements." (The Treaty of Peace 
and the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
Chechen Republic Ichkeria, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
BROADCAST, 13 May 97; via lexis-nexis)  
2) The Khasavyurt treaty specifies that "The agreement on the fundamentals of 
relations between Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic being 
determined in accordance with generally recognized norms of international law 
shall be reached prior to December 31, 2001." (IZVESTIA, 3 Sep 97; via ISCIP 
database) 
3) At the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul (and many times since), 
Russia agreed to provide access to Chechnya to humanitarian workers and 
inspectors, that the mandate of the OSCE mediation mission for Chechnya 
remains in force, and that its participation would benefit the political regulation of 
the conflict. 
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KYRGYZSTAN 
Authoritarianism, political repression real winners in Kyrgyz elections? 
Kyrgyzstan, once widely considered to be the most democratic Central Asian 
state, particularly by Western analysts, appears to be catching up quickly with the 
most authoritarian and politically repressive Central Asian state, Uzbekistan.  
 
The 12 March runoff elections for 68 parliamentary seats were even more heavily 
criticized by the OSCE and the Kyrgyz opposition (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 23 Mar 
00) than the first round of parliamentary elections had been. Mark Stevens, the 
chairman of the OSCE observer mission, told journalists that the Kyrgyz elections 
had failed to meet his organization's standards. Local election officials' 
interference in the polling process, as well as the fact that the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) permitted several candidates to stand for election in the first 
round but then barred them from participating in the second round, drew sharp 
criticism from OSCE observers. (KABAR NEWS AGENCY, 1700 GMT, 13 Mar 
00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Feliks Kulov, chairman of the Ar-Namys (Honor or Dignity) Party and one of the 
few prominent opposition candidates who was not kept off the ballot in the 
second round of elections, reported that in his voting district (Talas Oblast' in 
northwestern Kyrgyzstan) a number of votes were collected before the polls were 
officially open, blank ballots were sold, and his party's election observers were 
denied access to the voting stations. He also charged election officials with 
bribing and even threatening voters in order to persuade them to cast their 
ballots for the government-backed candidate, Alymbai Sultanov. (Sultanov won 
by approximately 16%.) (INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, 14 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis, 
and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Mar 00) 
 
By 15 March thousands of dissatisfied voters were protesting outside 
government buildings in Bishkek, Kara Bura (in Talas Oblast'), and Balykchy (in 
Issyk-Kul Oblast') as well as in Osh and Jalalabad Oblast's. The protesters 
 37 
accused the government of falsifying the voting outcomes in all of these regions 
and called for new elections to be held. (KYRGYZ TELEVISION FIRST 
CHANNEL, 1530 GMT, 15 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-
nexis, and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Mar 00) A bloc of five opposition parties 
(including Ar-Namys, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, and Daniyar 
Usenov's El Bei Bechara Party) released an official statement and list of 
demands to the Kyrgyz government on 20 March. They called on President 
Akaev's administration to annul the results of the elections in Talas Oblast', on 
the grounds that they were falsified; to punish all those officials responsible for 
perpetrating the election fraud; to review the courts' decisions to uphold the ban 
on numerous opposition candidates' participation in the elections; to release a 
number of opposition activists promptly from detention; and to stop harassing 
independent media agencies. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 20 Mar 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
On 22 March, perhaps in an attempt to dampen the protesters' enthusiasm, law 
enforcement officials arrested Feliks Kulov in the Bishkek clinic where he was 
receiving treatment for high blood pressure and chest pains and charged him 
with the misappropriation of funds and the abuse of power during his short stint 
as national security minister in 1997-1998. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 22 Mar 
00; via lexis-nexis) Although the earlier arrests of Mr. Kulov's campaign manager 
and other well-known members of Ar-Namys had done little to intimidate the 
demonstrators, government officials may have reasoned that the detention of Mr. 
Kulov himself would bring the protests to an end. However, the opposition 
leader's supporters responded to his detention by continuing their protests both 
in Bishkek and in Kara Bura and by issuing a second list of demands to the 
Kyrgyz government, calling for Mr. Kulov's immediate release from prison and 
urging all of the country's political parties and organizations to join together in 
resisting the government's heavy-handed actions. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 
31 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Mr. Kulov himself has gone on hunger strike in order 
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to protest his arrest and detention. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 31 Mar 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
Kyrgyz authorities did succeed in ending the opposition demonstrations in Kara-
Bura, but only after police chased the protesters out of the town's main square 
using truncheons. 120 of the demonstrators were taken into custody and bused 
to the local internal affairs ministry headquarters. Following the demonstration's 
forcible dispersal by the police, internal affairs ministry troops were stationed in 
the town, presumably in order to prevent any further opposition gatherings. 
(VECHERNIY BISHKEK, 23 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-
nexis) 
 
While the arrest of Mr. Kulov and numerous other opposition figures has not 
prompted his supporters to abandon their cause, what it has achieved is to make 
the Ar-Namys Party's chairman ineligible to run in Kyrgyzstan's next presidential 
elections. Under present Kyrgyz election law, anyone who has been charged with 
a crime is not permitted to run in presidential or parliamentary elections. As a 
result, President Akaev is not likely to face any serious opposition in his bid for 
reelection next December. Unless the Kyrgyz opposition is able to win the 
vociferous support of both international organizations and Western governments, 
President Akaev's administration will have little incentive to change the country's 
currently highly irregular election laws or to pursue any further political reforms. 
In fact, the Kyrgyz government seems to be well on its way to duplicating the 
type of harsh repression practiced by neighboring Uzbekistan. 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Tajik opposition grudgingly accepts flawed elections 
Despite numerous complaints of election fraud from nearly all of the opposition 
parties during Tajikistan's recent parliamentary elections, both regional and 
national party leaders have proclaimed their acceptance of the voting results, in 
order to preserve the peace process.  
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Leading members of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, the Democratic Party of 
Tajikistan (DPT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), and the 
Socialist Party reported numerous incidents of interference by local election 
officials in the polling process, as well as irregular voting procedures. On the eve 
of runoff elections in 12 voting districts, the Central Election and Registration 
Commission (CERC) suddenly invalidated a popular Communist candidate's 
registration, barring him from participating in the second round of voting. In two 
other districts where Communist candidates seemed likely to win in runoff 
elections, the CERC simply annulled the results of the first voting round, citing 
widespread election violations. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 
0330 GMT, 12 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) DPT 
and IRPT officials complained that their candidates often faced an undue number 
of campaign and registration restrictions and that their election observers were 
frequently not given access to the polling stations. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 0100 GMT, 10 Mar 00 and 1600 GMT, 27 Feb 00; BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) However, spokesmen for both of 
these opposition parties publicly declared their recognition of the election's 
validity and their acceptance of its results.  
 
The chairmen of the Leninobod branch of the DPT released a statement 
following the first round of parliamentary elections in which the party expressed 
its point of view quite bluntly: "We officially recognize the holding of elections to 
the Assembly of Representatives and local councils for the sake of the unity of 
society, of cooperation in the cause of ensuring political stability and the 
consolidation of democratic achievements." Although the party chairmen 
acknowledged that there had been irregularities in the election process, they 
went on to say that establishing a lasting peace in Tajikistan was of greater 
importance than the election outcome and their own party's interests. (VOICE OF 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 0100 GMT, 10 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring 
Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) 
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Although the Leninobod DPT chairmen's words are eloquent and their sentiments 
admirable, one must question how realistic their views of Tajikistan's situation 
are. In a country which for decades has been wracked by profound social and 
political cleavages, it was particularly important that these elections provide a 
more or less level playing field for the various regional factions to win 
representation in the national government, a goal which they have craved since 
before the civil war. Indeed, it was their lack of representation in republic-level 
politics which led to the outbreak of war in 1992. Unfortunately, Tajikistan's 
recent parliamentary elections did not provide the opportunities that they were 
originally slated to, a fact which nearly everyone seems to recognize. How much 
hope can we then realistically hold that the same dissatisfaction with the status 
quo which resulted in five years of civil war will not eventually bring about a 
similar chain of violence? 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
President proves that playing nicely with others brings few rewards 
Although neither the Turkmen nor the Azerbaijani media were willing to publish 
many details, on 9 March President Niyazov's press service revealed that the two 
countries' governments had come to an agreement on how to divide the Trans-
Caspian pipeline's capacity, once its construction has been completed. Instead of 
the two sides sharing the pipeline equally (Azerbaijan's original goal), it seems 
that Baku has accepted the Turkmen president's terms and agreed to a 5 billion 
cubic meter quota. This leaves Turkmenistan with more than 75% of the 
pipeline's capacity. (TURAN, 1655 GMT, 10 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0311, via 
World News Connection) This could be considered a substantial triumph for the 
Turkmen president's "get-tough" policy, if the pipeline were actually close to 
being completed. However, just two weeks after having achieved this victory, 
President Niyazov himself acknowledged that there is little hope that the 
pipeline's construction will even begin in the near future. According to the present 
timetable, work is to start in early 2001 and conclude two years later, but the 
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Turkmen leader told Shell representatives that unless the project receives more 
international support, it will not be carried out at all. (INTERFAX, 1426 GMT, 22 
Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0322, via World News Connection) 
 
President Niyazov's obstinacy and blunt words compelled the Azerbaijani 
government to meet his terms, despite pressure from the US and Turkey for him 
to soften his stance. Will he be able to achieve similar results with the 
international oil tycoons? Prior to his success in the pipeline quota deal with 
Azerbaijan, one might have said no, but perhaps President Niyazov's negotiation 
methods (or lack thereof) are exactly what is necessary in this situation. 
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